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v. Jackson, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec.
ENVIRONMENT-Bundy
31,439, at 18,528 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The courts have consistently expanded the recognition of
women's employment rights' since the passage of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.2 One of the more recent protections afforded is
that against sexual harassment of a female employee by her male
supervisor. 3 Although such conduct gave rise to a cause of action
under Title VII, a new dimension to that right was realized in Bundy
v. Jackson.4 Chief Judge Skelly Wright, speaking for the United
States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit extended
coverage to include women who were subjected to sexual harassment
which "polluted" the work environment even if the harassment failed
to result in a tangible economic injury.5 Adjusting the proof requirements on the issue of the plaintiff's right to back pay and promotion,
the court determined that the defendant had to discharge the burden
of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence."
In 1972, Sandra Bundy, a civil service employee of the District of
Columbia Department of Corrections, 7 rejected the sexual importunings of a co-worker, Delbert Jackson, the future Department Director. 8 By 1974, Ms. Bundy's first and second line supervisors, James
Gainey and Arthur Burton, had initiated a pattern of sexual entreaties

See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (eliminating gender-based height
and weight strictures); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (reversing decision
permitting defendant to deny applications from mothers with preschoolers); Sprogis v. United
Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) (striking down
no-marriage rule for stewardesses).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976). The pertinent part provides: -[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) . . . to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public Serv. 568
F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Carber v. Saxon
Business Prods., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
4 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,528 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 18,532.
IId. at 18,538.
7 Id. at 18,530. Ms. Bundy entered federal service in 1970 as a personnel clerk but had
attained the position of Vocational Rehabilitation Specialist prior to litigation. Id.
31,439, at 18,528 (D.C.
8 Brief for Appellant at 3, Bundy v. Jackson, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec.
Cir. 1981) (hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant). Despite Bundy's consistent refusals, Jackson
repeatedly phoned with invitations to join him at his apartment. Id.
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leading to her first complaint of sexual harassment." Lawrence
Swain, the supervisor of Burton and Gainey, to whom she appealed
for assistance, summarily dismissed the complaint as frivolous, and
then he sexually propositioned her.' 0
Following the harassment complaint to Swain, Burton and
Gainey began to criticize Bundy's work performance." When she
became eligible for promotion, Gainey claimed that a hiring freeze
precluded his recommending her, though others received advancement recommendations shortly thereafter.' 2 Upon the advice of an
Equal Employment Opportunity Officer, Bundy complained of sexual
harassment to Swain's supervisor. 13 Failing to resolve her dilemma,
she consulted the Chief EEO Officer. The officer, however, did not
bring the allegations to the Director's attention.' 4 Finally, Bundy
complained to Jackson and a meeting was held with her male supervisors. Her alleged inadequate work performance was discussed at the
meeting, but her sexual harassment complaints were not reviewed.' 5
She continued to file employment discrimination charges through the
Department grievance procedure. Jackson failed, though, to investigate the assertions beyond cursory questioning of the line supervi6
sors. '
Bundy filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, praying for declaratory and injunctive relief, back
pay, and promotion.' 7 She alleged that because of her womanhood
she had been subjected to oppressive working conditions different
from those imposed upon her male co-workers.' 8 The gravamen of
the complaint was that sexual innuendo and requests for sexual favors
created a psychologically harmful work environment which, in itself,
9 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,530. On one occasion, Burton suggested that her
horseback riding hobby was pursued in order to relieve unfulfilled sexual desires. He then
requested that they view sexual literature together to test his theory. Id. at 18,539-40 n.2. Gainey
repeatedly pressed her to accompany him to motels or to the Bahamas. Id. at 18,530.
1I Id. at 18,530. Upon hearing her grievance, Swain declared, "'any man in his right mind
would want to rape you."' Id.
ItId. They chastised her for excessive leave-taking and questioned the quality of her work.
12 Id.
1 Id. at 18,530-31. The supervisor responded that Bundy was not recommended for promotion due to her unsatisfactory employment record. Id.
14 Id. at 18,531. The EEO officer further warned Bundy of the difficulties inherent in
proving sexual harassment and cautioned against bringing unfounded claims. Id.
Is Id.
16 Id.
17 Bundy v. Jackson, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec.
9154, at 7003 (D.D.C. 1979). She exhausted
administrative remedies by instituting suit six months after filing the agency grievance. 24 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,540 n.6.
Is Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 20.
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justified a finding of illegality. 9 In his answer, Jackson denied that
that
agency personnel had engaged in sexual improprieties, asserting
20
non-promotion.
Bundy's
Ms.
justified
poor work performance
Although the trial court recognized that improper sexual advances were "standard operating procedure, a fact of life, a normal
condition of employment in the office," it held that the defendant had
not discriminated on the basis of sex. 2' The lower court found that
Bundy's superiors failed to take the harassment ritual seriously and
thus lacked the requisite retaliatory motive. 22 The United States
Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit overruled the district court's findings that terms, conditions, or privileges of employment had not been violated in the absence of a loss of employment
benefits. 23 Stopping just short of a ruling of "clearly erroneous" on
the lower court's fact-finding, the circuit court remanded with guidance because it adjudged that the evidentiary burdens had been improperly allocated .24
The court of appeals reaffirmed its landmark holding in Barnes
v. Costle25 that sexual harassment which conditioned continued employment on submission to sexual advances violated the Title VII ban
on sex discrimination. In that case, the plaintiff's job was abolished
because she refused her supervisor's sexual advances. 2 6 The court
found gender discrimination in that, "but for her womanhood," the
27
plaintiff would not have been pressed to submit to sexual relations.
As "a woman subordinate to the inviter in the hierarchy of agency
personnel,- 28 she was vulnerable to her supervisor's retaliatory
actions.
Relying on Barnes, Chief Judge Wright stated that Bundy had
endured similar discriminatory treatment. 29 The principle that employers were liable for their supervisor's discriminatory conduct was

11 Id. at 25.
20

Id. at 21.

21

Bundy v. Jackson, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec.

22

Id.

23

24 Empl. Prac. Dec.

9,154, at 7007 (D.D.C. 1979).

31,439, at 18,532.

2 Id. at 18,537.
25 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
26

Id. at 989.

Id. at 990. The "but for" test is equally applicable to cases involving homosexual advances
or harassment of men by women. Id. 990 n.55. While it is logically correct that a bisexual
supervisor could harass both men and women, and that this scenario would fall outside the
spectrum of sex discrimination, it carries the criticism of the "but for" analysis to an absurd
extreme. 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,540 n.7.
21 561 F.2d at 990.
31,439, at 18,532. See generally cases cited in note 3 supra.
29 24 Empl. Prac. Dec.
21
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equally applicable in Bundy. 30 An employer could be excused from
liability, however, if it took swift action to eliminate harassment by a
supervisor who acted in disregard of company policy and without the
employer's knowledge. The officials in Bundy could not avail themselves of this plea since they had failed to effectively3 curtail the
conduct despite having "full notice" of the harassment. 1
The circuit court next examined the unique question of whether
the pattern of sexual harassment was in itself sex discrimination without the attendant loss of tangible employment benefit. 32 It followed
the principle espoused in Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 33 that employers who encouraged or created "substantially discriminatory work environment[s] ' ' 34 based on race or ethnicity violated the provision against discriminatory conditions.
The Hispanic plaintiff in Rogers suffered a Title VII injury because her employer segregated clients based on race, 35 thereby offending the worker's sensibilities. 36 Judge Goldberg emphasized that "nuances and subtleties of discriminatory employment practices are no
longer confined to bread and butter issues" but extend beyond "hiring, firing, and promoting" to "intangible fringe benefits. ' 37 He
work environment
concluded that the psychological and emotional
38
falls within the protective ambit of the statute.
In Bundy, Chief Judge Wright noted that environment cases such
as Rogers, and those involving unequal dress codes, 39 demonstrated
violations under the Act, even though the defendant manifested a

"o24 Empl. Prac. Dec.

31,439, at 18,532.

31 Id. The higher respondeat superior employer liability standard espoused in Judge MacKin-

non's concurrence in the Barnes case was also satisfied. The court speculated that Jackson's claim
that he did not take the practice of harassment seriously was because an admission of such
activity would impact adversely upon the department. Id. at 18,540 n.8.
32 Id. at 18,532 (emphasis omitted).
33 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,532 (emphasis omitted). See also Firefighters Inst. for
Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819
(1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. City
of Buffalo, 457 F Supp. 612, 631-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
1s 454 F.2d at 237-38.
36 Id. at 238.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., Carrol v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C.
1973), vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part, 567 F.2d 429 (1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1977). But cf. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.
1975), vacating, 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973) (hair length rules for men not prohibited by Title
vII).
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benign intent. 40 Surely sexual harassment which purposely infuses
"the most demeaning sexual stereotypes" into the workplace and in4
vades one's "innermost privacy" deserves a similar interpretation. 1
In determining that a pattern or practice of sexual harassment
was in itself illegal, the court reasoned that women subjected to subtle
discriminatory schemes would continue to suffer if the court refused
to afford equitable relief. 42 The employer's sexual innuendo and
advances would accomplish the same result as a denial of tangible
benefits but would leave the impression that the ritual has no bearing
on employment decisions. 43 The alternatives available to the female
employee when no loss of employment benefit is threatened points out
the "'cruel trilemma"' which faces her. She may endure the demeaning gestures or slurs when good natured tolerance is required, dramatically refuse to cooperate and risk retaliation, or voluntarily quit her
employment with little prospect of legal redress. 44 Finding that
Bundy was the victim of an environment "polluted" with sex discrimination, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant
injunctive relief, 45 based on the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Final Guidelines on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace. 46 The Guidelines offer a broad definition of sexual harassment. 47 They support the proposition that employers should be held
strictly liable for discriminatory actions of agents and supervisory
personnel. 48 The essential thrust of the Guidelines is to prevent the
occurrence of harassment. 4 Although preventive measures are pre41

24 Empl. Prac. Dec.
Id. at 18,534.

42

Id.

40

43

"

31,439, at 18,533-34.

Id.
Id.

41 Id. Remedies under Title VII are confined to equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(g)
(1976). Although back pay and reinstatement are inapplicable, and emotional damages
unaffordable, the district court could consider an award of attorneys' fees on remand. See id. §
2000e-5(k).
46 45 Fed. Reg. 74676-77 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(a)-l1(f)).
41 Id. at 74677 (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)).
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment; (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or (3) such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.

Id.

Id Id. (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)). An employer should be liable for co-worker
harassment when authorization or knowledge is proven. Id. (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(d)).
49 Id. (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)).
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ferred, corrective measures might negate liability in appropriate circumstances. 5 Chief Judge Wright applied the foregoing recommen5
dations, ordering the Director to undertake certain remedial steps. 1
Turning to the proof issue on the claim for back pay and promo52
tion, the court declared that McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
and Day v. Mathews5 3 together enunciated the proper evidentiary
standards for sexual harassment cases. 54 In McDonnell Douglas, the
Supreme Court defined the prima facie case for refusal to hire based
on race 55 and declared that after the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case, the burden of demonstrating legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reasons for denial shifts to the employer. 5 If the employer discharges
this burden, the applicant is still accorded a "full and fair opportunity" to submit evidence refuting the employer's rationale. 57 Under
this formula, the burden of persuasion rests ultimately with the plaintiff. 58
The Bundy court adjusted the McDonnell Douglas formula to
analyze the claim for back pay and promotion. 59 To make out a
prima facie case Bundy would have to show that, as a woman, she
was a member of a protected group who, though qualified, was
refused a promotion, and that co-workers not within the group yet
similarly situated were promoted instead. 60 Unlike an individual
claimant, however, the court reasoned that since Bundy had already

5o Id. (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §§1604.11(d)-ll(e)).
5' 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,535. The employer must set up a policy prohibiting
sexual harassment, adequately educate employees as to its existence, investigate alleged misconduct, and employ disciplinary measures pursuant to Civil Service Commission Regulations §§
713,211-823, Fed. Pers. Manual Supp. 990-1 (1978) (cited in Bundy, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec.
31,439, at 18,535).
52

411 U.S. 792 (1973).

-1 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,535-39.
11 411 U.S. at 802. In the words of the Court:
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. (footnote omitted) (cited in Bundy, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,537).
56
17

411 U.S. at 802.
Id. at 805.

58 Id.

51 24 Empl. Prac. Dec.

31,439, at 18,538.
60 Id. The criteria used to judge the qualifications for a particular position varies from case to
case but proof of certain factors, including technical eligibility or current job ratings, could
satisfy a prima facie element. Id.
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proven systemic sexual discrimination, it proposed that she "enter the
ritual of order of proof at an advantage." 6'
Citing Day v. Mathews,6 2 the Bundy court analogized to employment discrimination based on race.6 3 Day involved a claim by a
black employee of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
who had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination by his
supervisors.6 4 The court declared that the burden of articulating
legitimate reasons for non-promotion must be discharged through
clear and convincing evidence. 5 Based on Day, the court in Bundy
posited two requirements for the prima facie showing of retaliation
for refuting sexual advances:
(1) that she was a victim of a pattern or practice of sexual harassment attributable to her employer; and (2) that she applied for and
was denied a promotion for which she was technically eligible and
of which she had a reasonable expectation.66
The court eliminated an element of the prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas by excusing the plaintiff from evincing that
others who were not members of the disadvantaged group received
promotions.6 7 It reasoned that once a woman has proved unlawful
discrimination in itself, it is fair to lessen the burden of proving that
men in similar positions were promoted instead. 6 After the case is
made out, if the employer successfully demonstrated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for denial by clear and convincing evidence,
the claimant may still offer proof that the reasons were mere pretexts
for discrimination. 69
The Bundy decision is significant for its understanding of sexual
harassment as a "pattern or practice" of discrimination in the work

"'
62

Id.
530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 31,439, at 18,538.
530 F.2d at 1083.
"I Id. at 1085. See also Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 444-45 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
" 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,539.
Id. Cf. Pettit v. United States, 488 F.2d 1026, 1033 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (claim of failure to
promote because of racial bias) (cited in Bundy, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,542 n.18).
In Pettit, the court adjusted the McDonnell Douglas formula and posited four elements necessary
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The critical omission in that test related to
proving the qualifications of co-workers, implying that the employer must rebut by demonstrating their worthiness for promotion.
24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,542.
"'
"'

67

"I

id.
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environment.7 0 Although the case involved a solitary claim, the
plaintiff offered proof that other women were subjected to similar
harassment. 71 As a systemic discrimination case, the Bundy allocation of the proof burden on the remedial issue of back pay and
promotion is analogous to that employed in a Title VII class action
73
case 72 and in a pattern or practice suit.
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., the plaintiff-class
proved a prima facie case of systemic racial discrimination in hiring,
firing, and transfer.7 4 As a result, the defendant was enjoined from
continuing the discriminatory practices. 75 When the Court considered the individual member's entitlement to back pay, the burden of
proving that each employment decision was based on nondiscriminatory policy shifted to the employer.7 6 This holding was followed in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, where the
government proved that the defendant engaged in a regular practice
of racial and ethnic discrimination in implementing its seniority system. 77 In Teamsters, the Court declared that the force of the evidence of discriminatory practices which necessitated equitable relief
did not disappear when the second question of individual relief
arose. 78 The defendant was required to dispel the inference that
7
specific employment decisions were based on discriminatory policy.
The Bundy court, in effect, applied this burden of proof theory in
systemic cases to the pattern of sexual harassment which pervaded the
Department of Corrections. The "standard operating procedure" of
sexual advancements and innuendo gave rise to a "polluted" discriminatory environment.8 0 Accordingly, the court ordered the district

70 A pattern or practice of disparate treatment based on sex is prohibited
under Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a)(1974). Legislative history defines a pattern or practice in the usual sense:
[A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of rights consists of
something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a
generalized nature. There would be a pattern or practice if . . . a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited by the statute . . . [s]ingle insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single business would not justify a finding
of a pattern or practice.
110 CONG. REc. 14270 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
71 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,540 n.3.
72 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
11 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United StatesJ431 U.S. 324 (1977).
74 424 U.S. 747, 751 (1976).
75 Id.
16 Id. at 772.
77 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977).
7s Id. at 361-62.
19 Id. at 362.
11 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,532.
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court to issue an injunction which would prevent further harassment. 8' Based on Franks and Teamsters, the burden of persuasion
properly shifted to the defendant in the determination of Bundy's
entitlement to back pay and promotion. 2 On remand, the defendant
was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that an adverse employment decision did not result from the practice of sexual
harassment 83
The more stringent "clear and convincing" standard is also employed in systemwide private sector cases. 84 The rationale is that a
court cannot exactly predict how an individual discriminatee would
have behaved in a nondiscriminatory environment. 8 5 Consequently,
the resulting uncertainty should be resolved against the party whose
activity gave rise to the cofitroversy.86 When a discriminatory environment has been proved, as in Bundy, a strict showing by the employer comports with the broad remedial thrust of Title VII cases to
7
make the injured person whole.
The McDonnell Douglas proof standard for individual disparate
treatment cases has been recently clarified by the Supreme Court in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.88 The plaintiff
in Burdine alleged that she had been denied promotion based on her
sex. 89 Justice Powell stated that once the plaintiff had made out the
prima facie case, the "intermediate burden" of clearly setting forth
"legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons" through admissible evidence
shifted to the employer.90 If the employer's burden of going forward
is discharged, the employee is then required to demonstrate intentional discrimination 9 ' by a preponderance of the evidence.9 2 Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that similarly situated employees
81 Id. at 18,534.

81 Id. at 18,539.
83

Id.

84 Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 445 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.

1033 (1974).
85 Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1379 (5th Cir. 1974).
86 Day, 530 F.2d at 1086.
87 Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). The Court emphasized:
It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award that 'provide[s] the spur or
catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history.'
Id. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N.L. Industries, 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
" 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
89 Id. at 1092.
10 Id. at 1096.
91 Id. at 1095.
91 Id. at 1093.
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the
were accorded favorable treatment.9 3 The court emphasized that
94
plaintiff.
the
on
remains
ultimate burden of persuasion always
Thus, in individual sexual harassment cases, the plaintiff must
carry the burden of persuasion on the issue of intentional discrimination. Moreover, in contrast to Bundy, she must prove, as part of the
prima facie case, that male employees in similar positions were given
favorable treatment. Although Burdine clearly construes evidentiary
burdens in favor of the defendant, it is distinguishable from Bundy
because it applies to individual disparate treatment cases rather than
systemic cases. Arguably, the Bundy rationale is consistent with Burdine because the plaintiff was required to discharge the burden of
persuasion by demonstrating sexual harassment.
Bundy represents an expansion of sex-based discriminatory conditions under section 703(a) of Title VII. Courts have consistently been
willing to identify disparate treatment in conditions based on race,
readily extending coverage to include patterns of derogatory nonverbal conduct. 5 Findings of impermissible sex-based conditions,
though, have not enjoyed a comparable evolution."'
In Carrollv. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,97 the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the class of female bank
employees required by the defendant to wear uniforms suffered disparate treatment since similarly situated males were not likewise imposed upon.18 The court founded its determination on the employer's
implication that women did not exercise good business judgment in
deciding how to dress for work. Overruling this justification as
"anathema to the maturing state of Title VII analysis,""" the court
emphasized the offensiveness of demeaning stereotypical assumptions.100 Viewing discriminatory dress codes as less invidious than
sexual harassment, Chief Judge Wright in Bundy likewise expressed
concern that women were unfairly stereotyped in the workplace.' 0 '

"IId. at

1096.
Id. at 1093.
" United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 632 (1978) (displaying picture of
Martin Luther King family with inscription "A bunch of niggers" written on it, wearing
"Wallace for President" buttons, and displaying other racially derogatory drawings).
9e For a discussion of unemployment compensation cases alleging sexist environment was
"good cause" for voluntarily leaving work, see Note, Protecting Women from Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace, 58 TEX. L. REv. 671, 683-85 (1980).
07 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
98 Id. at 1033.
99 Id.
94

100 Id.

10124 Empl. Prac. Dec.

31,439, at 18,533.
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This rationale has been adopted in a recent case, EEOC v. Sage
Realty, 0 2 in which the plaintiff was required as a condition of her
employment as a lobby attendant to wear a suggestive uniform. She
was therefore subjected to obscene comments and gestures by the
public. 0 3 Decided almost concurrently with Bundy, Sage Realty
relied on Barnes in holding that the employer's condition offended the
04
Title VII proscription against sexual harassment. 1
Given the occasion to construe sexual harassment as a Title VII
cause of action, early district court decisions preferred instead to
characterize the problem solely as one of "inharmonious personal
relationships."'' 0 5 The judicial fear of a multiplicity of suits arising
from the recognition of sexual harassment' 0 6 demonstrated the pervaThe Bundy court, in contrast,
siveness of the phenomenon. 0l'
squarely faced the problem by choosing to utilize broad remedial
guidelines as a preventive remedy. In fashioning injunctive relief, the
court in Bundy accorded deference to the agency guidelines; employees were encouraged to utilize existing grievance mechanisms.108
The scope of the measures extended to disciplining the offender 0 9 and
comported with the court's viewpoint that patterns and practices of
sexual harassment should be affirmatively uprooted.
Sexual harassment is highly subjective, encompassing a range of
possible behavior."10 In theory, men and women business executives
generally agree in their definition of the activity."' Yet, there is a
wide disparity in its perceived frequency, with women in middle level
management reporting a higher incidence than men in upper level
management."12 Social conditioning, lack of awareness, or denial by
507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
103Id. at 605.
102

101Id. at 609.
1"5 Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
'0' Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d
1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
107 L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 37-41
(1978).
10024 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,439, at 18,535.
109Id. Although the EEOC has promulgated recommendations respecting co-worker harassment, courts have generally failed to address the issue.
"10See WORKING WOMEN'S INSTITUTE; COMMENTS ON E.E.O.C.'s PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
1604.11, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
3-4.
" Collins & Blodgett, Sexual Harassment:Some See It. .. Some Won't, HARv. Bus. REV. 77,
80 (1981). Survey respondents specifically agree in their definition of blatant patterns, while
finding subtle examples ambiguous but, nevertheless, offensive. Id.
I Id. at 81-82.
ITS GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX TO ADD SEC.
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men of the existence of such behavior could account for this discrepancy." 3' Women executives view sexual harassment more seriously
than men. The degree to which it is treated seriously depends largely
on the amount of power retained by the individual making the advance. Since women remain in low paying, low status jobs," 4 their
vulnerability to sexual harassment by their supervisors is more acute.
Sexual harassment which reinforces the stereotypical attitude that
women are sexual objects helps to perpetuate the existing male-female
distribution of power in the workplace." 5
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines on
Sexual Harassment advocate strict employer liability for acts committed by supervisory personnel. 16 In traditional Title VII cases alleging
racial or religious bias, the courts have generally applied absolute
employer liability. 1 7 In sexual harassment cases, though, courts insist on requiring some measure of employer knowledge of or acquiescence in the conduct. The Barnes formula, directly relied upon in
Bundy, endorses the general rule in Title VII cases that a violation
automatically occurs unless the employer can demonstrate that: (1)
the supervisor defied company policy in the absence of employer
knowledge; and, (2) the employer took ameliorative action when the
harassment was discovered."18 In the absence of a reliance on respondeat superior principles, an "enormous loophole" in the statute would
be available to disavow a supervisor's sexual harassment of an employee. 1 9 While the plaintiff is not required to exhaust formal company procedures as a basis for notice,12 0 one court, attempting to
distinguish the Barnes opinion, imposed an affirmative duty to notify
management, finding that notice to the supervisor/harasser was insufficient.' 2 1 In the Third Circuit, some measure of "constructive
ll3Id. at 82. Women report an absence of managerial willingness to involve itself in alleged
instances of harassment, and a corresponding lack of support in dealing with such incidents. Id.
at 83-90.
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OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS (Feb. 1981).
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117 Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 n.7, 145 (5th Cir. 1975);
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grounds, 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975).
118561 F.2d at 993. But see id. at 995 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
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knowledge" is needed, but the requirement is ambiguous since it
mitigates the affirmative duty to complain. 22 The Bundy court applied the liberal but qualified Barnes analysis, raising the issue of
notice to explain that it had been fulfilled but failing to clarify the
2 3
requirement any further.1
Whether the plaintiff must complain, and, if so, to whom and in
what manner, obviously awaits future resolution. Consistent with the
recent trend in sexual harassment cases to utilize principles postulated
in racial discrimination decisions, and, in view of the congressional
desire to eliminate disparate treatment of the sexes,124 courts should
adopt strict employer liability in all instances. The lack of a cogent
rationale for applying a differential notice standard for sex discrimination is peculiarly glaring. In addition to the notion that strict liability is fair because employers benefit from the activities of supervisory
personnel under their direction, 2 5 effective enforcement of the statute
necessitates an adoption of this approach. Furthermore, imposition26of
strict liability allows the costs of discrimination to be distributed.1
The Bundy opinion is another attempt to render Title VII sexual
proscriptions viable despite persistent and subtle discriminatory
schemes, of which sexual harassment is one example. It signals a
commitment to a more flexible interpretation of conditions resulting
in deleterious stereotyping. Additional delineation on a fact by fact
basis will be unavoidable. As women become further engaged in
non-traditional occupations in which there are still disproportionate
numbers of men, they are apt to confront pervasive male sexual
aggression and offensive environments on the job. 27 In this particular arena, the willingness to continue to enforce Title VII prohibitions
against sex discrimination will, no doubt, be tested.
Marion S. Mogielnicki
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